The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess'. Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.

I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views (...) on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers’s hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered. (shrink)

Why is there something rather than nothing? This question, formulated by Leibniz, constitutes the basis of modern European ontology. In many ways this can be termed the main question of philosophy; but if so, a similar but less attended to question comes to mind, which I shall call the second best question of philosophy. The second best question of philosophy: Why is it better that there is something rather than nothing? seems to constitute a natural basis for moral theory. The (...) latter question often appears in philosophy of religion, in arguments leading to the thesis that God the Creator is good. Yet, modern moral philosophy tended to shy away from such a direct grounding in metaphysics. Not anymore. Luciano Floridi’s ethics based on anti-entropy is still a new and somewhat understated theory; having originated from information ethics it seems to have a hard time establishing itself as a general moral theory. But the potential of becoming a major alternative to the main positions in moral theory is there. It is my goal in this paper to highlight the promise, as well as certain difficulties, of Floridi’s theory. I will also undertake to move the work on anti-entropy ethics one step further, towards becoming a general moral theory. (shrink)

The trend to engage in online education becomes global allowing for truly international courses and degrees taught by faculty and attended by students from various universities, countries and continents. The traditional worries about quality of online education, and its applicability to the humanities, are the song of the past. Yet, philosophers are reluctant to join online education. This presents a danger to the professions since many potential philosophy classes will be delivered online in other related disciplines. Instead of lamenting the (...) situation I present some achievements in online learning of the University of Illinois at Springfield. (shrink)

Reiterative coordination games in large groups demonstrate that social norms, once attained, create stable equilibria. This shows that thin social capital is stable, and in some cases preferable to thick SC since it lowers transacting costs. This finding, supported indirectly by R. Putnam’s own early research, runs counter to his claim that the loss of thick social capital is detrimental to the modern society and to Coleman’s argument that closure is required for maintaining social capital.

We can define all political theories pertinent in contemporary modern societies using a model based on only two variables. The first variable can be characterized as a spectrum between economic right and left wing theories. The spectrum can be easily defined by a strictly economic tradeoff of the desired level of taxation juxtaposed to the desired level of social services. The second variable can be defined as a distinction between liberal-individualisticand communitarian conception of persons.This leads to four positions, the four (...) pillars of contemporary political philosophy: left wing liberalism (popular liberalism), right win liberalism (popular libertarianism), left wing communitarianism (popular socialist communitarianism) and right wing communitarianism (thetraditionalist stripe of conservatism). The problem is that the last of those positions has not been well presented in philosophical literature. (shrink)